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INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a 65 year old man who was injured on the job, sustained 
permanent injuries, and could not return to work. Mr. Enrique Martinez sustained injuries 
to his neck, right shoulder, and right hand, rendering him unable to use his right hand 
effectively. Mr. Martinez applied for, and was granted Social Security disability benefits 
as of the date of his accident. 
Mr. Martinez also applied for permanent total disability benefits with the Labor 
Commission. At his hearing, Mr. Martinez presented evidence concerning his injuries, 
his job duties as a fast food worker, and expert vocational evidence, showing that Mr. 
Martinez could not return to work, could not perform the essential functions of a fast food 
worker, and could not perform other work reasonably available. At the same hearing, 
Respondent's only witness admitted that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform 
with his injuries. Nonetheless, the ALJ ignored this evidence and denied Mr. Martinez's 
claim for benefits. 
Mr. Martinez filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission, to reverse 
the ALJ's denial of benefits. In response to Mr. Martinez's motion for review, the Labor 
Commission denied Mr. Martinez's claims, and made the same glaring omissions as the 
ALJ. Specifically, the Order failed to consider the undisputed evidence concerning the 
essential functions of a fast food worker, and that those functions require at least average 
ability to use both hands. Nor did the Order consider the observed limitations found in 
Mr. Martinez's functional capacity evaluation. Nor did the Order consider Respondent's 
ii 
admission that there were no jobs - - fast food or otherwise, that Mr. Martinez could 
perform. Consequently, the Order failed to disclose the steps it took in analyzing the 
evidence, and ultimately denying Mr. Martinez's claims. 
This court should reverse the Labor Commission's Order, and find that Mr. 
Martinez satisfied his burden of proof, demonstrating that as a result of his industrial 
accident, he can no longer perform the essential functions of a fast food worker, and that 
there is no other work reasonably available to him. Alternatively, this Court should at 
minimum, remand this case to the Labor Commission for additional findings of fact, 
consistent with this Court's order and the evidence introduced in the case. 
in 
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STATEMKNJ "Hi I" JUKI. >UI< I HH i 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Martinez1 s appeal because the Labor 
Commission has engaged in action that is arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
4 ( t b ] ( ) | 4 M i i ) . • '" • 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSlJES 
The issue in this case is whellu-i ihc Labor Commission's order denying Mr. 
Mil line/ 's hciicl il •,, ... ., consider uncontradicted material evidence in support of 
Mr. Martinez's claims was arbilntn 01 « npi i. u us. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ri L ,* xu*n Niiuuid review the Labor Commission's Order under a correction of 
error standard < i i|nrsiinn n( pirntl \*\w 1111I1 the ^nicy's decisionmaking or 
procedure. Ouestu - , r J Co. v. State Tax Cornm'n. 817 P.2d 316 (Utah IW | j li \i i 
case, the Supreme Court stated that under UAPA, "agency determinations of general law 
ait: e to b zre\ ie vv e d i inde i a c oi i c: etion of ei roi standard, giving no delcrence to the 
agency's decision." Id. at 31 7. Iliis Coi irt shoi lid gn e no defer e nee to the • I all: c i 
Commission's decision because it failed to discharge its statutory duty to make adequate 
findings of fact and conclusions ol law in light oi the evidence. 
PROVISIONS, >. 1 X If il 1111 ,,'S, > M111 IN \ IN I i' ,N, , \ IN 11" M11 11 IS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-1 : i , a . seq., "The Utah Workers Compensation Act" or 
" The Act". 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner/Appellant, Mr. Enrique Martinez, briefly worked for Media-Paymasters 
as an extra on a movie set. Mr. Martinez also held a second job at McDonald's as a fast 
food worker. On 10/28/96, Mr. Martinez sustained significant permanent injuries when 
he fell down some stairs while working for Media-Paymasters. Mr. Martinez injured his 
neck, right shoulder, and right hand in the accident. Mr. Martinez filed and application 
for hearing, asking the Labor Commission to award him time loss, medical treatment 
benefits, and an permanent impairment award as a result of his industrial accident. The 
Commission found that Mr. Martinez had sustained the injuries described above and 
found that he had sustained measurable permanent impairment as a result of his industrial 
accident. Media-Paymasters paid the benefits due under the Order. 
Mr. Martinez attempted to return to work, both at Media-Paymasters and at 
McDonald's, but neither employer was willing to accommodate his limitations from his 
work injuries. Mr. Martinez applied for Social Security benefits and was awarded those 
benefits as of the day of his industrial accident. 
Mr. Martinez then filed and application for hearing asking the Commission to find 
that he was permanently and totally disabled from his industrial injuries sustained at 
Media-Paymasters. 
Based on the law in effect on the day of Mr. Martinez's accident, permanent total 
disability claims envision a multiple hearing process. At the first hearing, Petitioners 
must demonstrate that: they were injured by accident in course and scope of the 
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employer's employment; they sustained injuries that limit their ability to do basic work 
activities; that those limitations prevent them from performing the essential functions of 
jobs they were qualified to do at the time of the injury; and, that no other work is 
reasonably available. If Petitioners sustains their burden of proof, the burden then shifts 
to the employer to develop an reemployment plan, or simply pay permanent total 
disability benefits. 
At Mr. Martinez's hearing, it was established that Mr. Martinez had sustained a 
significant injury in the course and scope of his employment at Media-Paymasters that 
limited his ability to do basic work activities. Therefore, the issues in the case were 
whether Mr. Martinez's job injuries prevented him from performing the essential 
functions of his job, and if so, whether there was any work reasonably available to Mr. 
Martinez. 
On 5/3/01, Mr. Martinez presented evidence of his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits before the ALJ. 
On 7/15/03, the ALJ issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The 
ALJ denied Mr. Martinez's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Mr. Martinez 
filed a motion for review with the Labor Commission, asking the Commission to reverse 
the ALJ's order. On 6/15/04, the Labor Commission affirmed the denial of Mr. 
Martinez's claim, while acknowledging the deficiencies of the ALJ's prior order. 
On 7/13/04 Mr. Martinez filed his Petition for Review of Order, and this appeal 
followed. 
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FACTS 
1. On 10/28/96, Mr. Enrique Martinez was injured while working for Media-
Paymasters as an extra on a movie set when he slipped and fell down some stairs, 
landing on his right hand. The Labor Commission found that Mr. Martinez injured 
his neck, right shoulder, and right hand in the accident. Mr. Martinez worked part-
time for McDonalds at the time of the accident. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order (3/29/00), included in Appellant's Appendix at 4. 
2. The Labor Commission acknowledged Mr. Martinez's right hand problems 
since the industrial accident: 
In the morning, the fingers of Mr. Martinez's right hand may 
feel numb. This involves the first three fingers and they also 
seem weak, so that he may drop things. This occurs 
occasionally on the left, but chiefly on the right. If he uses a 
hammer, the whole hand feels weak. He gives examples 
where he used to drive a six penny nail with one hand, he now 
has to use both hands. 
The Labor Commission's Medical Panel Report is included in Appellant's 
Appendix at 6. 
3. The Commission's conclusions were consistent with the opinions of Mr. 
Martinez's doctors. Dr. Dennis Wyman's 3/1/98 note stated: 
1. Neck pain: The patient has decreased range of motion 
and posterior neck pain with pain radiating into the 
upper back. Also, numbness is noted in the right 
thumb and index finger on an intermittent basis. 
MRE 280 (emphasis added). Dr. Wyman diagnosed Mr. Martinez with "cervical 
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strain/sprain with probable C5-6 disc herniation on the right side." Dr. Wyman's 
records are included in Appellant's App. at 21. 
Mr. Martinez assigned a 3% whole person impairment ("wpi") rating for his 
cervical spine, due to a "medically documented injury, persisting symptoms, mild 
degenerative changes, and permanent activity restrictions." Id. at 13. The 
Commission also assigned a 6% wpi rating for his right shoulder because of right 
shoulder limitations as a result of his 10/28/96 industrial accident. Id. The Panel 
also assigned a 3% impairment rating for Mr. Martinez's low back injury due to 
"medically documented injury with persisting symptoms and (mild) (Moderate) 
degenerative changes, and permanent activity restrictions." Id. 
On 10/24/00, Mr. Martinez completed Respondent's functional capacity 
evaluation with Mr. Davis. According to Mr. Davis, Mr. Martinez scored "well 
below the SEDENTARY level" on the Epic Hand Function Sort. Appellant's App. 
at 29. Mr. Martinez's demonstrated abilities scored below 1% of the normal 
population on his right hand grip strength test. Id. at 20. Mr. Martinez could stand 
for only eighteen minutes, and could only walk on the treadmill for six minutes, 
and stopped due to cervical and lumbar pain. Id. at 19. Despite these limitations, 
Mr. Davis categorized Mr. Martinez in the "LIGHT" category of work. But 
according to Mr. Davis, "[d]ue to self limitation and reported pain, most activities 
in [Mr. Martinez's] evaluation would be more consistent with a SEDENTARY 
work level." Id. at 22. Mr. Davis did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Martinez 
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testified that he gave a good effort during the FCE. Appellant App. at 43. A copy 
of the hearing transcript is included in Appellant's Appendix. 
At the time of his accident, Mr. Martinez's job duties at McDonald's included 
cleaning, making sandwiches, preparing bread, mopping, sweeping, taking out the 
garbage (20-35 pounds,3-4xday), and required him to bend, stoop, and kneel 
down. Mr. Martinez testified that all McDonald's employees had to mop, sweep, 
and take out the garbage. Appellant App. at 36-7. 
Mr. Martinez testified that after he was medically stable from his injuries, he 
contacted both Media-Paymasters and McDonald's, and asked if he could return to 
work with his limitations. Media-Paymasters was not willing to hire Mr. Martinez. 
Mr. Martinez's former supervisor Lavon, told him that they had no light duty 
positions, and that all employees had to do some of the following: take out 
garbage, mop, sweep, clean, bend, stoop, etc. Appellant App. at 37. 
Mr. Martinez also testified that he asked Lavon about the cashier position. 
Mr. Martinez testified that the cashier position would require cashiering for an 
hour, then clean and do other activities, and that cashiers did not do exclusively 
cashier work for a full shift. Appellant App. at 38. 
Mr. Martinez testified that he was unable to perform his prior job at 
McDonalds. Appellant App. at 38. 
After McDonalds and Media Paymasters declined to re-hire Mr. Martinez, he 
applied for social security disability benefits. The Social Security Administration 
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found that Mr. Martinez was disabled and awarded him disability benefits as of the 
day of his industrial accident. A copy of the Social Security transmittal letter is 
attached in Appellant's App. at 80. 
11. Mr. Martinez has not worked at any job since his industrial accident. 
Appellant's App. at 36. 
12. Mr. Martinez testified that after retiring from his former work as a 
maintenance worker, he did not want to retire from the workforce, and that was 
why he went back to work for both McDonald's and Media-Paymaster. 
Appellant's App. at 38. 
13. Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D, testified as to Mr. Martinez' inability to find work 
due to his industrial limitations. Dr. Farnsworth first considered Mr. Martinez's 
past work to determine what skills, if any, could transfer. Dr. Farnsworth 
concluded that Mr. Martinez's past work skills as a maintenance worker were not 
transferable. Dr. Farnsworth's report is included in Appellant's Appendix at 84. 
14. Dr. Farnsworth then examined Mr. Martinez's functional capacity from the 
FCE. Appellant's App. at 49. She then looked for unskilled jobs in the light 
capacity with a limited ability to walk and stand, and with limited finger dexterity, 
and found none in Utah. Id. 
15. Dr. Farnsworth specifically considered whether Mr. Martinez could return to 
work as a fast food worker. Dr. Farnsworth considered Mr. Martinez's results 
from the VALPAR assembly test during the FCE. That test concluded that Mr. 
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Martinez's manual dexterity was "Poor." Appellant's App. at 28.l Dr. 
Farnsworth also considered Mr. Martinez's medical records. Appellant's App. at 
52. Dr. Farnsworth testified that fast food workers need to have at least an 
"average" level of finger dexterity to perform the essential functions of those 
position at a competitive level, and that Mr. Martinez lacked that ability. Id. 
16. Dr. Farnsworth also considered whether any accommodations could be made 
to help Mr. Martinez find work. She concluded that there were no 
accommodations that could improve Mr. Martinez's manual dexterity. Based on 
the foregoing, as well as Mr. Martinez' age of 61 (at the time of his hearing), Dr. 
Farnsworth concluded that training someone Mr. Martinez' age was not feasible. 
Appellant's App. at 50. 
17. Ms. Kit Bertsch testified for Respondents, and was Respondent's only 
witness. 
18. Based on Mr. Martinez's past employment, Ms. Bertsch only considered fast 
food jobs in preparation for the hearing. Appellant's App. at 60. 
19. On direct examination, Ms. Bertsch testified that Mr. Martinez could only 
work at "modified" jobs, as opposed to past work or currently available work: 
Atty: So, in your opinion, based on your 
reports, there are jobs reasonably 
available that Mr. Martinez can perform 
1
 An person with average manual dexterity would score 100%, Appellant's 
App. at 49. Mr. Martinez scored only 45%. 
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Ms. Bertsch: I think based on modification of 
the same job, or modification of a 
different job at the same site. 
Yes. 
Appellant's App. at 60 (emphasis added) 
20. Ms. Bertsch also conceded that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could 
perform with his limitations, and that any job for Mr. Martinez would have to be 
"created" by any potential employer: 
Atty: I understood the crux of your testimony 
[is] that all of the jobs that you claim Mr. 
Martinez could perform do not exist at this 
point, but instead would have to be creations, 
modifications, changes in existing jobs; did I get 
that right? 
Ms. Bertsch: Yes, they would be modifications 
based on what the employer said. 
Atty: Right. We're not talking about existing 
jobs; we're talking about jobs that would be 
created effectively by the employer by changing 
the current jobs; do I have that right or not? 
Ms. Bertsch: Correct. 
Atty: So you're not testifying that there are jobs 
currently available for Mr. Martinez to go out 
and take; instead, you're testimony is that all the 
jobs you think [Mr. Martinez] could take would 
have to be created by employers; is that correct? 
Bertsch: Correct. 
Appellant's App. at 61. 
21. Approximately two years after the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ denied Mr. 
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Martinez's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (7/15/03) included in Appellant's App. at 118. 
22. Mr. Martinez filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission, asserting 
that the undisputed evidence - - including Respondent's own FCE and its expert 
who admitted there were no jobs he could perform - - showed that Mr. Martinez 
was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. 
23. The Labor Commission denied Mr. Martinez's motion, holding that Mr. 
Martinez could return to his job as a fast food worker, notwithstanding his "poor" 
ability to use his hands, as demonstrated on Respondent's FCE. The Order ignored 
Mr. Martinez's functional limits demonstrated during Respondent's FCE, except to 
recite the FCE's conclusion that Mr. Martinez can perform work in the "Light" 
category of work. The Order does not mention Respondent's admission that Mr. 
Martinez can not perform any jobs. Order Denying Motion for Review (6/15/04), 
included in Appellant's Appendix at 126. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE ORDER FAILED TO CONSIDER MATERIAL EVIDENCE, 
INCLUDING THE WORK LIMITATIONS SHOWN IN THE 
FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY EVALUATION, AND UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WERE NO JOBS MR. MARTINEZ 
COULD PERFORM, AND THEREFORE, THE ORDER LACKED 
SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO DISCLOSE THE STEPS THE 
COMMISSION TOOK IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER COULD 
PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF A FAST FOOD 
WORKER. 
As set forth in the Order, the central issues in the case were whether Mr. Martinez 
could still perform the essential functions of his job, and if not, whether there was other 
work reasonably available that he could perform. Utah Code Ann. § 34-A-2 (413). 
Although Mr. Martinez presented compelling and undisputed evidence on both points, 
there is no indication from the Order that the Commission even considered that evidence. 
It is well established that administrative agencies must make specific findings of fact that 
show the steps it took in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the Order simply ignored the 
undisputed evidence that showed Mr. Martinez was entitled to a preliminary finding of 
permanent total disability under the Act. This sections points out the evidence that the 
Order failed to consider, and demonstrates that Mr. Martinez is entitled to a preliminary 
finding of permanent total disability under the evidence presented at the hearing. 
JL The Facts Showed that Mr. Martinez Could Not Perform The Essential 
Functions of a Fast Food Worker Because His Industrial Injuries Limited 
His Ability to Use His Hands. 
A. Mr. Martinez Presented Uncontradicted Testimony That His Job 
Required Him To Use Both Hands. 
Mr. Martinez showed that he could not perform the essential functions of a fast 
food worker due to his work injuries, because the essential functions of a fast food worker 
requires average ability to use of both hands. First, Mr. Martinez testified that his duties 
included cleaning, making sandwiches, preparing bread, mopping, sweeping, taking out 
the garbage (20-35 pounds,3-4xday). Mr. Martinez testified that all employees had to 
mop, sweep and take out the garbage - even cashiers. Facts f 6. All activities described 
by Mr. Martinez required the ability to use both hands. 
B. Dr. Farnsworth's Testimony Was Undisputed That Fast Food 
Workers Must Have At Least Average Ability To Use Both 
Hands. 
Dr. Farnsworth testified that Martinez's physical limitations prevented him from 
performing the essential functions of a fast food worker. Dr. Farnsworth explained that 
the essential functions of a fast food worker require at least "average" manual dexterity to 
perform at a competitive level. This stands to reason: no employer in a competitive 
business setting would choose to hire an employee who could not use both hands where 
the work involved manual labor, including making food items, cleaning, and cashiering. 
To the contrary, no employer would hire or retain an employee who could not perform 
these tasks on at least an average level. 
C. Respondent's Functional Capacity Evaluation Showed That Mr. 
Martinez Could Not Perform The Essential Functions of a Fast 
Food Worker. 
Respondents' own FCE demonstrated that Martinez lacked the physical capacity to 
perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. Before showing how the FCE 
results precluded Mr. Martinez from performing those functions, some general 
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background information is necessary. 
Generally, functional capacity evaluations, or "FCE's" describe the physical 
activities and tolerances demonstrated during a one or two day examination. These 
specific activity tolerances are then used to determine whether employees are physically 
capable of performing a particular job. In addition to determining specific physical 
tolerances, the FCE may also describe a person's general work category according to 
Department of Labor standards, such as "sedentary, light, or medium" category of work. 
The work category can not not stand alone; it must be considered along with the 
employee's specific activity tolerances. See, e.g., Appellant's App. at 80-82. Put another 
way, an employee who may be categorized in the "light" work category, is not necessarily 
able to perform the full range of work in that category. Instead, the work category is a 
generalized starting point. Then, the employee's specific work tolerances must be 
considered to determine whether certain tasks - and therefore, certain jobs requiring 
those tasks - must be eliminated. See, e.g., Appellant's App. at 90-3. In this case, the 
Labor Commission only considered the general category of work from the FCE, and not 
Mr. Martinez's demonstrated limitations which precluded him from returning to work as a 
fast food worker. 
Mr. Martinez's FCE demonstrated his significant work limitations. During the 
FCE, Mr. Martinez' manual dexterity was determined to be "poor." Facts ^15. Although 
he was able to sit for long periods, his standing was limited to twelve minutes (static) and 
18 minutes (dynamic). Appellant's App. at 26. Mr. Martinez lifted and carried twenty 
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pounds once, but had trouble holding onto and gripping the weight with his right hand. 
Because Mr. Martinez lifted and carried twenty pounds once, he fell into the general 
category of "LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of Work Level." Appellant's App. 
at 29. Mr. Davis admitted, however, that due to Mr. Martinez's observed self-limitation 
and reported pain, Mr. Martinez's abilities "would be more consistent with a 
SEDENTARY work level." Id. Despite these observed functional limits, the Order 
simply failed to consider them in concluding that Mr. Martinez could perform the 
essential functions of a fast food worker. 
D. The Order Failed To Consider the Functional Limits 
Demonstrated During the FCE. 
The Order demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the limitations shown 
in Mr. Martinez's Functional Capacity Evaluation, or "FCE." Instead of considering the 
specific limitations shown by the FCE, the Order summarily concluded that ''Mr. 
Martinez has the physical ability to perform light work." Appellant's App. at 119. The 
Order also stated that the FCE "documented substantial symptom magnification" by Mr. 
Martinez, but failed to state how any alleged magnification affected the observed 
tolerances during the evaluation. Nor did the Order point out that Mr. Davis, the physical 
therapist hired by Respondents to perform the FCE, was not present at the hearing to 
explain his beliefs about alleged symptom magnification, and be subjected to cross-
examination. The Order also failed to explain the significance of the alleged symptom 
magnification - yet the Order found that Mr. Martinez could work in the Light category, 
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and not the Sedentary category, as observed during the evaluation. Apart from the 
generalized work category, the Order also failed to explain why it did not consider the 
specific limitations demonstrated during the FCE. 
The Order cited conflicting opinions as to Mr. Martinez's functional abilities, but 
still found them to be "accurate descriptions of Mr. Martinez's true abilities." Appellant's 
App. at 120. The other work restrictions cited in the Order were provided by Mr. 
Martinez's orthopedist approximately three and one half years before the hearing, 
Appellant's App. at 132. Compare with Appellant's App. at 133. Those general 
restrictions specifically contradicted the observed limitations of the FCE. The Order 
never mentioned the conflicting views of Mr. Martinez's limitations. Ordinarily, 
important conflicts involving medical facts - such as functional limits from work injuries 
- are sent to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-601. The Order's failure to 
consider Mr. Martinez's observed limitations during the FCE also prevented it from 
recognizing any potential conflict. It is impossible to determine from the Order why Mr. 
Martinez's observed work limitations were not considered. 
Apart from the objective observations in the FCE, the Order flatly ignored 
Respondent's admission that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could perform in 
finding that he could still perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. 
E. The Order Ignored Respondent's Admission That There Were 
No Jobs That Mr, Martinez Could Perform, Including Fast Food 
Jobs. 
Respondent's admission that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform 
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demonstrated that he could not perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. As 
set forth in the facts section, Respondent's expert witness, Ms. Kit Bertsch, repeatedly 
conceded that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform. Ms. Bertsch first testified 
that Mr. Martinez could still work as a fast food worker. But when she was specifically 
asked whether Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of a fast food worker, 
she admitted that any fast job would require "modification of the same job, or 
modification of a different job . . . " Facts at f 19. Consequently, Respondent failed to 
rebut the evidence that showed Mr. Martinez could not perform the essential functions of 
a fast food worker. Ms. Bertsch then admitted that Mr. Martinez was unable to work at 
any existing jobs, and that instead, an employer would have to specifically create a job for 
him. Facts at 120. 
Put simply, given that there are fast food jobs available to qualified applicants, Ms. 
Bertsch's admission that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could perform shows that 
he is not able to perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. Further, Ms. 
Bertsch's admission that any potential employer would have to specifically create or 
modify an existing job to accommodate Mr. Martinez's work limitations, further 
demonstrates that Mr. Martinez can not perform the essential functions of a fast food 
worker.2 
2
 Ms. Bertsch's admission also shows that unlike the Order, Respondent's 
expert witness could not ignore the specific limitations of the FCE in concluding that 
there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform. 
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2, Respondent's Admissions Also Showed That There Was No Work 
Reasonably Available to Mr. Martinez. 
Those same admissions also showed that Mr. Martinez could not perform "other 
work reasonably available" under the Statute. The Act requires petitioners to show that 
there is no other work reasonably available, considering his age, education, work 
experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-
413(a)(iv), also known as "Step (iv)." Under Step (iv), an employee must show that there 
is no work reasonably available. The Commission's own rules require that at minimum, 
reasonably available work must be "regular, steady, and readily available."3 Reasonably 
available work must exist to be "available," let alone "reasonably available." This 
underlying assumption has been recognized by every court that has interpreted the 
availability of work under the permanent total disability statute.4 Conversely, no court 
has interpreted reasonably available work to mean imaginary or hypothetical jobs. In Mr. 
Martinez's case, Respondent conceded that no jobs existed that he could perform. Taken 
3
 R612-l-10(D)(l)(b). This rule became effective on 12/15/02, about one 
year and eight months after the hearing, but about five months before the Order was 
issued. Martinez asserts that the Rule simply helped codify the boundaries of reason in 
determining permanent total disability claims. Any interpretation of "reasonably 
available" work must first require that some specific work exists that Petitioner can 
perform. 
4
 See, e.g., Smith v. Mitv Lite. 939 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App 1997) (work 
must exist in stable job market); Hoskings v. Indus. Comm'n. 918 P.2d 150, 157 (Utah 
App 1996) (requiring actual, not hypothetical, job). 
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together with the other consistent testimony and reports5, the Order should have found 
that Mr. Martinez satisfied step (iv) under the Act. 
Remarkably, the Order failed to even mention Respondents' damaging admissions, 
although they were specifically emphasized in Mr. Martinez's Motion for Review. It is 
impossible to determine from the Order whether the Commission even considered this 
otherwise fatal evidence to Respondents, let alone what weight, if any, was assigned in 
consciously rejecting it. These admissions were critical because they went to the central 
issues in the case, namely, whether Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of 
his job, and whether there was other work reasonably available. 
3^  The Order's Failure to Consider Uncontradicted and Compelling Material 
Evidence Rendered it Inadequate as a Matter of Law. 
The Order failed to make the detailed findings of fact required to support its 
conclusions. As the Supreme Court stated in Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service 
Comm'n.. 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986): 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings 
of fact is essential to a proper determination by an 
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and 
law, are reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot 
perform its duty of reviewing [ALJs'] order in accordance 
with established legal principles and of protecting the parties 
and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative 
5
 See testimony of Dr. Farnsworth that there are no jobs that Mr. Martinez 
could perform, and that training him would not be feasible, given that he was 61 years old 
at the time of the hearing. Facts at f 16. 
8 
action.6 
Where the Order simply ignored undisputed evidence, as here, the Order lacked 
"sufficiently detailed [findings] to disclose the steps by which . . . conclusions of mixed 
fact and law, are reached." Id. Under Milne, the Order is inadequate as a matter of law 
and should be reversed. This Court should find as a matter of law that Martinez could 
not perform the essential functions of a fast food worker, nor was there any work 
reasonably available for him, and thereby satisfied Step (iii) and (iv). 
6
 Adams v. Indus. Comm'n.. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Milne 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n.. 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986) with approval) 
(internal citations omitted). 
9 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the Commission's Order 
denying him permanent total disability benefits. Alternatively, this Court should, at 
minimum, remand Mr. Martinez's claim for additional factual findings consistent with 
this Court's Order and the evidence presented in the case. 
10 
DATED this 3-? day of December, 2004. 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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